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Operations and Practice, A Comparison
The United States Supreme Court
by Justice Potter Stewart*

PROFESSOR TRIBE, MR. Justice Dickson, ladies and gentlemen:
When I became the junior Member of the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1958 the Chief Justice was Earl Warren, and the other
Justices were Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Douglas, Tom
Clark, John Harlan, William Brennan and Charles Whittaker. Today only
Bill Brennan and I are left. He is the senior Member of the court and I
am next. The present Chief Justice is Warren Burger, and the other
Members of the Court are Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist and John Stevens. Two
others have come and gone during that period, Arthur Goldberg and Abe
Fortus.
It is certainly accurate to say with such a change in its membership
that the institutional personality of the Supreme Court of the United
States has greatly changed in twenty-one years, but I think it is also accurate to say that the institutional character of the Court has changed remarkably little in the past twenty-one years or even the past fifty years.
There has been a basic continuity, at least since the Judiciary Act of
1925, in the way the Supreme Court does its work and the work itself.
I came to the Court at the beginning of the 1958 Term and in that
Term the aggregate of cases on the Court's calendar numbered about
1800. In the Term that ended last July we had to deal with over 4500
cases. That is an increase of 150 percent if my mathematics are correct.
The question that immediately presents itself is how does the Court
manage such a huge volume of cases. The answer is, as Professor Gressman pointed out this morning, that since 1925 the Court has had the
authority in most cases on our docket to screen the cases and select for
argument and decision only those which in our judgment raise the most
important and far-reaching questions. By that device we select annually
for decision on the merits only a small fraction of the total, something
approximating 200 cases in all.
Each Justice receives copies of every certiorari petition and every response to that petition. Each Justice without any consultation with his
colleagues reaches his own tentative conclusion whether the petition
should be granted or denied. The first consultation with his colleagues
about each petition comes at the weekly Court conference during which
that case is listed for discussion on the agenda.
We sit in conference almost every Friday during the term. Those Friday conferences begin at 9:30 in the morning and continue through the
day except for a half hour recess for lunch. Only Members of the Court
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are present at the conference. There are no law clerks, no stenographers
and no pages, only the nine of us. The junior Justice acts as guardian of
the door. Our conferences are held in a rather small oak-paneled room
with one of its walls lined with books from floor to ceiling, and over the
mantle of the marble fireplace hangs the only picture in the room, a portrait of Chief Justice John Marshall. In the middle of the room stands a
rectangular table large enough for the nine of us comfortably to be seated.
Upon entering the conference room each of us shakes hands with each
one of his colleagues.
Each of us brings to the conference his own copy of the agenda of the
cases to be considered, some eighty or ninety cases each week, and each of
us before coming to the conference has done his homework and noted on
his copy his own tentative view as to whether review on the merits should
be granted or denied. The Chief Justice begins the discussion of each
case. Discussion then proceeds down the line by seniority until each Justice has spoken. The voting goes in reverse order if there is any need for a
formal vote following the discussion.
Each of us has a docket book containing a sheet for each case with
appropriate places for recording his vote and the votes of his colleagues.
When any case receives four votes for review, certiorari is granted and
that case is then transferred to the argument calendar.
This so-called rule of four is not written down anywhere so far as I
know, but it is an absolutely inflexible rule, so that even if a majority of
five believes strongly that a case should not be reviewed on the merits,
certiorari is nevertheless granted for a minority of four. Oral argument
ordinarily takes place about three or four months after the petition for
certiorari is granted.
Each party was originally allowed an hour per side for argument, but
in recent years we have limited oral argument to half an hour a side.
Counsel submit their briefs and record in sufficient time for the distribution of one set to each Justice two or three weeks before the argument,
and all of the Members of the present Court follow the practice of reading the briefs before the argument. We follow a schedule of two weeks of
argument followed by two weeks of recess. During the recess is when we
try to get our opinions written and continue deciding the constantly incoming certiorari petitions.
At the Friday conference discussion of the dozen or so cases that
have been argued earlier that week we follow the same procedures I have
described for the discussion of the certiorari petitions except, of course,
the discussion of the argued cases is generally much more extended. The
discussion of the case may be spread over two or more conferences, and
not until the discussion is completed and a tentative vote is taken is the
opinion assigned. The assignment is made a few days after the conference
in which the decision has been reached.
The senior Member of the majority designates one of his colleagues
or sometimes himself to write the opinion of the Court. This means that
the Chief Justice assigns the opinions in those cases in which he has
voted with the majority, and that the senior Associate Justice in the ma-
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jority assigns the opinions if the Chief Justice is in the minority. The
others agree among themselves in somewhat of a less formal way who will
write the dissenting opinion. Each Justice is free to write his own individual opinion concurring or dissenting.
The writing of an opinion is not easy work as I have learned in these
past twenty-one years. It always takes weeks and sometimes it takes
months to write an opinion. When the author of an opinion for the Court
has completed his work he sends it to the print shop in the basement of
the building. Once typeset, the author sends a printed copy to each member of the Court, those dissenting as well as those in the majority. Often
some of those who voted with him at the conference will say they want to
reserve final judgment pending the circulation of the dissenting opinion.
It is a common experience that dissenting opinions attract new votes,
even enough votes sometimes to become the majority opinion. I have converted more than one of my proposed court opinions into a dissent before
the final decision was announced. Prior to a final decision, a constant interchange goes on among us by written memoranda, by telephone and in
lunch table conversation while we work out the final form of the Court
opinion. There was one case this past term in which I circulated ten
printed drafts before one was finally approved as the opinion of the
Court.
This briefly sketches our procedure. The point is that each Justice,
unless he disqualifies himself in a particular case, passes on every piece of
business coming to the Court. Our Court does not function by means of
committees or panels. Each Justice passes on each petition. The precise
method that a Justice may follow in meeting the enormous case load varies, but there is one uniform rule. A subject is not delegated. Each Member of the Court decides each case in sufficient detail to resolve the question for himself, so that in a very real sense each Court decision reflects
an individual decision of every Justice.
The process can be and often is a lonely troubling experience for fallible human beings conscious that their best may not be adequate to the
challenge. A Justice does not forget how much may depend upon his decision. He knows it may affect the course of important social, economic and
political currents in our national life. But the fact that Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States have always been called upon to face
and to decide issues that may involve some of the dominant social, political, economic and even moral and philosophical problems generated by
their times does not mean that the Court is charged with making social,
political, economic or philosophical or moral decisions. It is quite the contrary. The Court is not a council of platonic guardians whose job it is to
decide difficult and delicate questions according to the Justices' notions
of what is just or wise or politic. To the extent that this function is a
governmental function at all, it lies with the people's elected representatives, the legislative and executive branches.
The judicial branch is charged with deciding controversies according
to the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The issues arise in
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the framework of concrete litigation, cases or controversies. They may be
decided on particularized facts bound in the record made in a trial court
or in an administrative agency. This is not to say that it is often easy to
resolve these controversies by simply referring to the w'ords of the statute
or the Constitution.
So far as the Constitution is concerned the founding fathers knew
better than to pin down details too closely. They drafted principles rather
than precise details. Thus it is that the Constitution does not take the
form of a litany of specifics. There are not many cases where the answers
are clear one way or the other. Particularly difficult are the cases which
involve conflicts between individual human beings and governmental
power, whether in the form of state or federal government.
The field, which in my time has primarily absorbed the Court's attention, is constitutional law. In those situations where the Constitution
or statutes do not clearly decide the. case, a Justice must rely upon his
own basic understanding of the Constitution and the law, bringing to bear
his own intellect, his own learning, his own experience and his own conscience. For him the complex phenomenon that lawyers know as law is
always an unfinished tapestry the weaving of which is never done.

